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This study first delineates the conceptual and practical issues in corporate governance,
without assuming any prior understanding of corporate governance. It then surveys,
using some of the more objective international criteria, the institutional record for
quality corporate governance in Africa.
In our conclusion, we suggest that corporate governance in Africa is enriched by
expanding the framework of analysis beyond the conventional criteria developed
from the limited assumption of homo economicus. Incorporating the influence of
norms and values or moral sentiments can improve our understanding of board
room dynamics and the characteristics of the decision management and decision
control they engender in “Business Africa.”Résumé
La présente étude s’attache dans un premier temps à délinéer les questions
conceptuelles et pratiques touchant la gouvernance d’entreprise, sans supposer
aucune connaissance préalable en la matière. Ensuite, à l’aune de critères
internationaux plus objectifs, elle passe en revue les exemples institutionnels d’une
gouvernance d’entreprise de qualité en Afrique.
Notre conclusion laisse entendre qu’en Afrique, la gouvernance d’entreprise s’enrichit
en étendant le cadre d’analyse au delà des critères conventionnels élaborés à partir
de l’hypothèse limitée de l’homo economicus. En intégrant l’influence des normes
et valeurs ou sentiments moraux, nous pouvons améliorer notre compréhension de
la dynamique des réunions et des caractéristiques de la gestion et du contrôle des
décisions qu’ils engendrent dans l’environnement d’affaires en Afrique.*The Author is both a professor at the School of Economics, University of Cape Town, South Africa and the Department of
Accounting and Management Sciences, University of Jos, Nigeria.
Corporate Governance in Africa: The




This study reviews the institutional record of “corporate governance” in Africa and offers some
policy directions for improving performance. The underlying thesis is that a crisis of governance is
basically a crisis of board of directors. Our approach is to first delineate the conceptual and
practical issues in corporate governance, without assuming any prior understanding of corporate
governance. Proceeding under this constraint forces us to be more mindful of jargons, a strategy
that we hope should open the ideas to more constructive debates that are obviously required in
such a timely topic. We have always believed that research in corporate governance is an agenda
that can benefit from insights from other disciplines that study organizations, such as organizational
psychology and sociology. For instance, the concept of “bounded rationality” taken from psychology
has been used by economists to shed light on why contracts are necessarily incomplete, and, by
linking that to transaction costs, to make sense of the many observed agency relationships that
leave agents with a great deal of discretion (even when the power corrupts). We end by surveying,
using international criteria, the institutional record for quality corporate governance in Africa. In
our conclusion, we argue that corporate governance in Africa is enriched by expanding the framework
of analysis beyond the conventional criteria developed from the study of business cultures that do
not incorporate the African perspective.
From a practical point of view, the problem of “corporate governance” is concerned with the
design of institutions that induce management in their actions, to take into account the welfare of
stakeholders–investors, employees, communities, suppliers, and customers. On the other hand,
management runs the firm through managing its day to day operations and setting its business
strategy. At least, in the “structure-conduct-performance” paradigm, management’s perceptions
of the market structure and the firm’s strengths and weaknesses jointly determine their choice of
corporate strategy (long-run plan for profit maximization), and organizational structure (the internal
allocation of tasks, decision rules, and procedures for appraisal and reward, selected for the best
pursuit of that strategy). Both corporate strategy and organizational structure influence the economic
performance of the firm and the market in which it sells. Market structure refers to certain attributes
of the market that influence the firm’s conduct. Attributes such as the number and size distribution
of sellers and buyers, extent of barriers to entry and exit, extent and character of product
differentiation, extent and character of international competition, and certain parameters (elasticity
and growth rate) of demand.6 Melvin D. Ayogu
On the other hand, boards of directors are supposed to govern the corporations: They have
the power to set dividends, to hire, fire, and set the compensation of the senior executives; to
decide to enter new lines of business; and to reject merger offers or to approve and submit them
to stockholders.
Nominally, and by law, the stockholders own a corporation. However, their rights are in fact,
quite limited. Generally, stockholders can vote to change the corporate charter. They can elect the
directors and remove them by a majority vote. They usually have the right to vote on substantial
structural changes, such as mergers, or the sale of most of the corporation’s assets. But that is
about all there is to the much talked about “residual rights.” The stockholders cannot set the
dividends that are paid to them. They have no role in investment or acquisition decisions. They do
not hire the managers or set their pay, and they have no say in setting prices. By electing directors
who are empowered to hire and fire management and to make or ratify all major management
decisions, the stockholders can, it is true, indirectly affect the decisions that are made. And if the
directors do not follow their wishes, the stockholders can replace them, at least in principle. But
how well has this worked in practice and has it worked to make the directors diligent? If not, what
should be done to remedy the situation in Africa? That is the thrust of our analysis.
2. Conceptual issues in corporate governance
It will be fruitful to frame the discussion around aspects of management that the board is supposed
to monitor and control, and around factors that can impair the board’s ability to discharge these
responsibilities. Additionally, we consider factors that may hamper the ability of stakeholders to
“incentivize” (i.e., constructively control) the board.
We begin by observing that the hallmark of the modern corporation is the separation of
ownership rights and control rights.1 The problem inherent in such separation of rights have been
extensively studied and are generally well appreciated even though satisfactory solutions are yet
to be devised. In many economies of the industrialized world, notable strides have been made in
aligning the interests of managers and owners. But by and large, problems persist. In fact, the
renewed interest in corporate governance (concomitant with the current interest in civil governance)
is indicative of the growing realization that while many academic papers preach socially efficient
outcomes based on invisible hands, experiences–many of which are reported in the media–warn
us otherwise. The so called invisble hands of the market are in fact visible. They are the humans
who run the corporations and sundry enterprises that populate the domain of “free” markets. And
“like the rest of us, corporate managers have many personal goals and ambitions, only one of
which is to get rich” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998).
3. Managerialism, abuse of discretion, and self-succession problems
Early research in this area is due to Jensen and Meckling (1976) who identify two types of conflicts:
One from managerial moral hazard since, in not having full ownership, managers are unable to
capture the full benefits of their efforts. As well, they do not bear the full costs of their actions. This
conflict has been described as “managerialism” or “managerial agency.”
Furthermore, the complexity of the coordination task in the modern firm (corporation),
imperfect information (uncertainty), and bounded rationality (the limit to one’s knowledge and
therefore, to the ability to contractually provide for all contingencies) all combine to necessitate
the vesting of managers with discretion. Such discretion, however, creates opportunities for self-Corporate Governance in Africa: The Record and Policies for Good Governance 7
interested behavior by the managers. This temptation to self-aggrandize is reinforced by having
different sets of information available to agents and principals (whether it be managers and members
of the board, or the board and the stakeholders). This information asymmetry can mean that those
who in practice discipline the managers may not be able to monitor cheaply the performance of
the managers.
Disciplining errant managers can also be a difficult problem when there are missing markets,
such as the market for corporate control. And even when no markets are missing, it seems that
management have become increasingly adept at entrenching themselves. The literature on corporate
governance tells of chief executives vested with wide discretionary powers who have exploited
this scope to entrench themselves and their allies on the board, sometimes using the resources of
the organization to perpetuate their tenure. This was rampant in the USA during the wave of
mergers and corporate takeovers in the 1980s.
Some of the self-perpetuation ploys have even been defended on efficiency grounds. Take,
for the example, the case of golden parachutes. A golden parachute is a clause in a compensation
contract providing for very attractive benefits in the event that a manager leaves after a control
change. The efficiency arguments run as follows: Career executives have a legitimate right to expect
protection of the rewards earned through years of hard, skillful work. Without adequate protection,
executives would fight for their dues, thereby diverting attention from valuable activities.
A cynical opinion would consider this a veiled threat or, at the very least, an admission that
managers abuse their office–that they do use the resources of the organization to pursue
entrenchment. The managers threaten in the following terms: Unless you bribe me, I will not give
my best. Moreover, I will waste your resources trying to defend whatever quasi-rents I am able to
extract from you.2 An alternative view would suppose that if executives have made a valuable
specific investment, it would be curious that raiders would so often be eager to dismiss them. It
seems more reasonable to suppose that raiders fire managers with bad records who also happen
to be the ones more likely to resist vigorously such takeover initiatives. Nonetheless, we note that
some firms have become target of takeovers by altogether doing too well.
More commonly, people object to golden parachutes on the grounds that they defend
entrenched managers, not the firm, and that they are costly for stockholders. As a matter of fact,
the parachutes are financial insurance contracts (options), except that in this case, the insurance is
bought and paid for by the stockholders for the benefit of the managers. Moreover, if they are too
lucrative, managers may be too ready to encourage a control-change.
These safe-bailout devices may also encourage valuable managers to leave the firm after a
control change, thus reducing the expected after-takeover value of the firm. Thus, it might actually
make desired takeovers less likely. Thus far, we have tried to underscore the idea that managers
take the issue of “self-succession” seriously, and that corporations recognize this.
4. De facto and de jure control
Checks on the tendency to self-perpetuate can be expected to come from those who govern the
corporation, usually understood to be the board of directors. In deciding whether the directors
really have de facto control, consider the following: The directors must rely on the officers of the
firm to provide them with information needed to make decisions. By controlling the flow of
information to the board and by setting the agenda, the senior executives may have effective
control of many of the decisions that are nominally controlled by the board.8 Melvin D. Ayogu
The board members are effectively chosen by the senior executives and thus are beholden to
them. Granted, the shareholders elect the board, but they invariably simply select from the menu
of candidates on the proxy statement circulated by management. Therefore, management effectively
decides who is nominated.
Milgrom and Roberts (1992) characterize stockholders of modern corporations as owners
who have vested so much decision rights in their agents that they (the owners) are left with few
residual rights: “Rights that are strictly delimited and enumerated.” These authors argue that if the
residual claimants are not in a position to control the decisions that affect the value of their assets,
then the incentive properties that have been claimed for ownership are obviously weakened. It
follows that if the incentive for ownership is weakened, corporate governance stands indicted.
5. Quasi-rents and executive compensation; tasks and temptations
One of the most serious efficiency effects of the “self-succession” game is the influence costs.3
Influence costs are unavoidable in view of the huge amounts of quasi-rent (hereafter called rent)
implicit in the relatively fat compensation packages of corporate managers. Firms create rents
whenever they pay higher-than-market wages to motivate workers in jobs where good performance
is vital and monitoring is difficult, as in the case of CEOs. Firms may also offer premium wages to
attract and to retain superior workers or to reduce turnover among employees who have received
specialized training. Also, rents may be created when workers are trained in skills that are of value
to other employees because the trained workers will later be able to demand higher wages or
move to a new employer for a higher wage.
The ability, in an organization, to generate and to distribute rents implicitly to juniors confers
additional ways and means by which management may entrench itself. It allows venal managers to
suborn subordinates who may otherwise act as a source of information to either the board or to
stock-holders (“the whistle blowers”). In practice, some rents arise in the form of perks and the
consumption of perquisites. Summing up, therefore, it should not be too surprising that corporate
managers seek to entrench themselves. But why not by a demonstrably superior performance?
An answer to why managers are reluctant to place their faith on “performance” lies in what
Kerr (1975) has called “the Folly of Rewarding A, While Hoping for B.” Kerr calls attention to
the existence of distorted incentives and the problems they create. He concludes that two main
causes of distorted incentives are “fascination with an ‘objective’ criterion [where] individuals
seek to establish simple quantifiable standards against which to measure and reward performance,”
and “overemphasis on highly visible behaviors, [when] some parts of the task are highly visible
while others are not”.4 In addition, little direct empirical evidence exists on the connection between
effort and retention of CEOs. However, it would appear that many of the acquisitions and takeovers
of the 1980s were based on criteria other than the lack of diligence on the part of the managers.
We are again reminded that some firms became prime targets by doing altogether too well.
The question that naturally arises from the preceding discussions is whether the huge amounts
that executives get paid motivate them to do a good job running the companies entrusted to them.
Or are the huge compensation packages in fact the result of managerial moral hazard, with the
CEOs lining their pockets at the expense of the owners of the firms? It is abundantly clear that
senior executives have remarkably broad responsibilities and broad discretion in determining their
behavior and the objectives and policies their firms will pursue. Therefore, a system that seeks to
provide incentives to senior executives may need to be concerned not just with any single dimension
of their behavior, such as how hard they work, but also with how they allocate their time andCorporate Governance in Africa: The Record and Policies for Good Governance 9
attention among different concerns. The theory of performance contracting suggests that explicit
incentive (direct performance) pay should become more important at the top of the hierarchy. This
indicates that the intensity of incentives should be higher when the marginal productivity of effort is
higher and when the potential responsiveness to incentives is greater. One would suppose that the
quality of the “top gun” should have a greater impact on overall organizational performance. The
wide discretion given to CEOs also means that they have more ways in which they can be responsive
to increased incentives. But why pile incentives upon incentives? Some shareholders may ask why
we are bribing managers to do what they are paid to do in the first place?
A further issue in motivation is why managers would shy away from profitable but risky
investments? One explanation is that the returns to the investments are not solely the financial ones
accruing to the risk-neutral owners of the firm. Of concern also are the effects of the investment
return on the manager’s human capital. Often their human capital is by far their most valuable
asset. Being essentially non transferable, there is little hope of diversifying away the risks attached
to it and so, without some incentive for risk taking, managers may sensibly be reluctant to “stick
their necks out.”
6. Perceptions of ownership and corporate expectations
In the preceding section, we presented arguments that link the intensity of incentives to its potential
responsiveness (presumably along a single, well defined, dimension). But what happens now that
the concept of corporate governance has become encompassing, moving beyond stockholders
and creditors to embrace a more diverse constituency, with heterogeneous and changing preferences?
With corporate responsibility and social accountability mixing with all the ’isms, “mission setting”
and incentive problems in the private sector are increasingly becoming similar to those in
governments. In governments, the multiplicity of tasks, and the fuzziness of objectives combine to
render the design of incentives very difficult.
Ultimately, this suggests that to properly evaluate corporate performance in Africa, it might
be useful to do a survey of the tasks and temptations facing managers, as well as a survey of
“corporate expectations” and perceptions of ownership. We should not take for granted a general
understanding of whose interests should count in managing the corporation. In all industrialized
nations, the matters of corporate responsibility and social accountability by firms and multinational
corporations have become increasingly relevant.
In a now-dated survey conducted in Japan regarding perceptions of ownership and interests
[Aoki (1984)], presidents of major firms, senior executives, and middle managers were polled
regarding their perceptions of ownership. They were asked: On whose interests should corporations
be run? and To whom do corporations actually belong? The results were unexpected and most
revealing. The number of respondents mentioning employees as those on whose interests the firm
should be run (80%) was almost as large as those mentioning stockholders (87%). And most
company presidents indicated that the firm should belong to both groups, with society as a whole
also getting many votes.
On the question of whose interests were actually being served, the most common answer
was employees, with shareholders coming second. Again, most of the presidents mentioned both
groups, but a full 20 percent indicated that shareholders’ interests did not count in running the firm.
With the growing interest worldwide in social accountability, it may not be surprising to find that
these views (in its many shades) are not limited to Japan.10 Melvin D. Ayogu
7. Cross-continental trends
Only very recently has cross-country information on corporate governance issues begun to emerge.
Currently, a wealth of information is coming from the European Union as a by-product of the
European Commission’s 1988 Transparency Directive on voting rights. Another source of data is
the on-going international research initiative, the European Corporate Governance Network
[ECGN]. Becht and Roell (1999) briefly preview the field survey on large shareholdings in Europe
carried out under the ECGN initiative. One of the most striking facts to emerge from the survey is
that blockholdings in Europe are much higher than in the USA, and that the separation of ownership
and control manifests itself in a fundamentally different way in Europe than in the USA.
The authors report that “while in the USA the main agency problems seem to arise from
conflicts of interests between managers and dispersed, in-sufficiently interventionist shareholders,
in much of continental Europe there are generally large blockholders present who can and do
exercise control over management.” In Europe, then, the main potential conflict of interest lies
between interventionist major shareholders and powerless minority share-holders.
Another insight into cross-cultural differences in corporate governance is offered by Bianco
and Casavola (1999), who describe the ownership and concentration structure in Italy. As in most
of continental Europe, ownership is characterized by a high degree of concentration, both for
listed and unlisted firms. There is also a limited separation of ownership and control of firms, with
governance structures built around familial relationships, and a widespread use of pyramidal groups.
Pyramidal groups are organizations where legally independent firms are controlled by the same
entreprenueur (the head of the group) through a chain of ownership relations.
8. The record in Africa: analytical framework
Modigliani and Miller (1958) postulated conditions under which capital structure is irrelevant.
However, when information is imperfect, financial structure matters, as does the range of available
financial instruments. Financial structure, ownership and corporate control are inextricably linked.
The pattern of financing (financial structure) affects the kinds of securities issued. Securities are
not simply claims on cash flow; they confer certain rights on decision making and control (i.e., they
define alternative governance modes). According to Williamson (1988), debt governance works
out of rules, while equity governance allows much greater discretion. Equities typically confer on
the holders, the right to elect directors through voting, whereas debt entitles the holders to repossess
collateral when the company defaults on promised payments. The rights attached to securities
become critical when managers of companies act in self-interest.
However, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1998) remind us that the view that
securities are inherently characterized by some intrinsic rights is incomplete, predicated as it were,
on the legal environment in which the securities are operative. Therefore, differences in legal
protections might help explain capital structure across countries. Legal rules pertaining to the
rights of investors, and to the quality of enforcement of those rules cover such issues as the ease of
participation in corporate voting; the ease of communication and the rights to lawful assembly;
legal protection against expropriation by management; the ability of creditors to realize collaterals
in the case of de-fault; and the difficulty for management in seeking unilateral protection from
creditors.
Collectively, these rules measure the ease with which investors can exercise their powers
against management, and hence shed some light on the quality (or potential thereof) of corporateCorporate Governance in Africa: The Record and Policies for Good Governance 11
governance across countries. Al-though, the theoretical literature is rich in prescriptions on how to
rank governance systems, what emerges in empirical work is primarily based on the feasible set of
data available at a point in time. For instance, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1998) construct some measures of quality governance in terms of protection of (minority)
shareholder rights, protection of creditor rights, and law enforcement. Also, between 1992 and
1995, three study groups have produced codes of good conduct or of best practice for boards in
the UK. The recommendations contained in the three sets of reports, came to be known in 1998,
as the Combined Code (Short, 1998). In the US, the largest public pension fund, Calpers (California
Public Employees’ Retirement System) has as well proposed recently 37 principles of good
governance. Calpers intends to grade the companies on their compliance with these principles and
to publicize the results, so as to induce proxy votes for companies that comply least (in principle,
if not in practice). Drawing  from the various sources in the literature, we summarize these governance
factors in Table 1.
9. The Record
Below, we present a comparative institutional record of corporate governance in a sample of
African countries, followed by some country specific remarks. We focused on those indicators
that were not only available, but were easily measurable in terms of more objective criteria. Being
accessible in a wider selection of African countries was an added advantage in deciding on the
indicators to use. Consequently, we did not directly measure such indicators as quality of “rule of
law” or “legal enforcement,” or “accounting standards.” We would like to note, however, that a
global comparative evaluation of countries on legal rules etc. ranks high, the African countries in
the sample (La Porta et al., 1998). The countries listed in the sample are Kenya, Nigeria, South
Africa, and Zimbabwe. In “shareholder rights around the world”, South Africa scored 5(4) where
4 is the mean for country group in the English-law origin while the rest of the listed African countries
each scored 3. To provide a fairer perspective, it should be noted also that the mean for French-
origin, German-origin, and Scandinavian-origin country groups are 2.33, 2.33, and 3.0 respectively.
In “creditor rights around the world,” all the sample African countries scored 4(3.11) with the
exception of South Africa that scored 3. Similarly as reported above, the mean for the other law-
origin countries are 1.58, 2.33, and 2.0 respectively. In “rule of law,” Kenya scored 5.42, Nigeria
2.73, South Africa 4.42, and Zimbabwe 3.68. The mean for the English-origin group is 6.46,
French-origin 6.05, German-origin 8.68, and Scandinavian-origin 10. All countries in the
Scandinavian group scored a perfect 10.
The broadest indicator used in our survey are Structure of the Board, and Product Market
Competition. Other indicators such as the existence of market for corporate control, and data on
ownership concentration are reported for a smaller subset of countries. The countries reviewed
(in one form or another) are, in alphabetical order, Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya,
Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The twelve countries
which we evaluate belong to the set of 21 African countries with stock markets although the
inactive status of the Abidjan Exchange (in Côte d’Ivoire), following the opening of the Regional
Stock Exchange [BVRM] reduces the active set to twenty. And although some of our data source
were published in 1999 and 2000, the currency of the information embodied in the data ranges
from 1993 in the case of some of the reported company data for Ghana to 1998 in the case of
South Africa.12 Melvin D. Ayogu
Table 1: Catalog of Indicators of Quality Corporate Governance
Implicit incentives: Implicit incentives: Threat of management change from the market for
Market for corporate takeover acts corporate control, through takeovers and proxy fights,
an agency of external control. It and bankruptcy or reorganizations Other implicit incentives
is one of the mechanisms by
which the Monitor is monitored
Other implicit incentives: Product Competition provides a yardstick for performance evaluation.
market competition and monitoring  Also, by increasing the threat of bankruptcy, it reduces
by capital markets complacency. Performance monitoring by capital markets
occurs through institutional investors: pension funds, mutual
funds, banks, venture capitalists, concentrated private
ownerships
Explicit incentives: Compensation Compensation base: Compensation should not be based on
packages (bonuses and stock factors outside the manager’s control.
options) Bonus based compensation induces managerial myopia,
based as it were on current profits. Conversely, stock options
induce a long-term view, and are based on market data. So
the articulation between both incentives matter if we are to
avoid incentive imbalance. Both are complements.
Board elections: how are directors Nomination rules for rotation on the board. Majority and super-
elected? majority rules for elections.
How are directors removed? Term limitations (some form of mandatory retirement for
directors)? What are the opportunities for removing members
of the board for malfeasance or nonfeasance?
Board succession rules in place? Does the company require CEO’s recommendation as to her
successor should she/he unexpectedly become disabled?
Board composition -Proportion of outside directors [greater than 50% means
majority in the firm; over 80% means super majority (John, and
Senbet, 1998)]
-Foreign-director ratio
-Is CEO also the chair of the board (this arrangement could
imply management entrenchment)? Is it unlawful in the
country to combine both portfolio, or does it differ across
companies?
Board size Diminishing marginal returns to size (Lipton and Lorsch,
1992; Jensen, 1993). Evidence that CEO’s incentives from
compensation and the threat of dismissal greater if board
size is small (Yermack, 1996)
Committee structure: To accomplish -Monitoring committee group consists of nominating cmte,
their tasks, boards operate through compensation cmte, and audit cmte.
committees -Productivity committee group consists of finance cmte,
investment cmte, and strategic cmte
Assessing the character of the -Are there explicit rules (in the corporate law of the country
board: whether active or indolent? or articles of association) that audit cmte be made up on non
executive directors (i.e., outsiders)?
-Is the compensation cmte dominated by outsiders? Are
these members largely executives in other companies?
-Can outside directors seek independent professional advice
at company’s expense?
-Independent nominating cmte? (According to Calpers,
“independent” means composed entirely of outside directors.)
-Independent compensation cmte?
-Independent audit cmte?
Investor activism: monitoring can be -What is the process for putting shareholder resolutions to the
speculative or active. “Active” means ballot? Are shareholder resolutions feasible? A shareholder
forward looking. resolution is a measure requesting or instructing the board
“Speculative” means relating to past and management to follow particular policies. They represent
performance. Active monitoring attempts by stockholders to direct the affairs of the firm without
requires control so as to implement replacing the board or management.Corporate Governance in Africa: The Record and Policies for Good Governance 13
new ideas or oppose bad policies -Are class action suits (on behalf of shareholders) possible?
or managers. -Are derivative suits on behalf of the corporation possible?
-Speculative monitoring by rating agencies, creditors, and the
media affect equity value (and hence compensation)
-Is there an active shareholder’s association
-Ease of communication between investors and between
company and investors (quality of communications
infrastructure)
-Proxy by mail allowed?
-Cumulative voting or proportional representation?
 “Cumulative” means that you can vote all your shares for a
single director
-Is the minimum proportion of shares that entitles a
shareholder to call an Extraordinary shareholders meeting
less or equal to 10%?
-Oppressed minority mechanism in place? This pertains to the
existence of judicial avenues to challenge decisions of
management or assembly, or to exit by having the company
purchase their shares when the minorities object to certain
fundamental changes. Changes such as mergers, asset
dispositions, or amendments to the Articles of Association
-Are proxy fights made very costly due to securities regulatory
constraints?
Composition of ownership: Activism Institutional or insiders: banks, pension funds, mutual funds,
is linked to structure of ownership households, non financial business, government, foreign
Ownership concentration Dispersed or block holdings? What is the three-shareholder
concentration ratio, i.e., fraction of ownership by the three
largest shareholders?
Creditor rights, and bankruptcy law -Are creditors consent required to file for reorganization?
(La Porta et al., 1998) -Is there an automatic stay of execution on secured assets?
-Management does not remain on the job during
reorganization?
Accounting standards Transparency and quality of disclosure of financial
information, including auditing and reporting standards
Notes: Regardless of the scope for misbehavior, explicit and implicit incentives partly align managerial interests with
that of the firm. “cmte” means committee. In a proxy fight, a stockholder or a group seeks either election to the board, or
support by a majority of the shareholders for a resolution on a specific corporate policy.
Table 2 presents an indication of potential peer competition that exists within each sector of
the economy. In practice, competition is likely to be more vigorous than revealed by these numbers.
The reason is that there are private companies that are well managed which are unlisted but compete
within the same sector as listed companies. So, the given numbers represent baseline market
discipline. All the reported figures are not current as at the publication of the source document,
because of publication lags.
Table 3 shows comparative data on the distribution of size of board of directors of firms by
sectors across countries. The data for Nigeria and South Africa are relatively more current (based
on reported statistics as at end year 1998). John and Senbet (1998) summarize an empirical study
by Yermack (1996) on board size. The main findings are that, the market penalizes large boards–
between 4 and 10–beyond which no systematic relationship appears to exist; profitability ratios
and asset utilization ratios deteriorate rapidly over the range of board sizes between 4 and 10, and
less discernable beyond; CEO incentives from compensation and the threat of dismissal operate
more strongly in firms with small boards. The study also found that the market rewards the
separation, within the same company, of the positions of CEO and Chairperson of the Board.












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.16 Melvin D. Ayogu
to the distribution of the absolute numbers. We consider this distribution (modal board sizes) next.
In Botswana, the most frequently occurring board size is 12; in Côte d’Ivoire 8 (out of 31
listed firms, with one company having a combined CEO/Chairperson); in Ghana 7* and 9 (asters
denotes the dominant size); in Kenya 7* and 9; in Mauritius 5, 9* and 10*; in Namibia 11 and 12
(split evenly); in Nigeria 10; in South Africa 4; in Swaziland14; in Zambia 8; in Zimbabwe 6 and
8*. Evidently, South Africa is the only country with a good record on this criterion, while Namibia
is inconclusive. At the extreme side of sizes, we note two financial services companies in Mauritius
having 21 and 22 directors.
Although data on structure of ownership and concentration as well as on mergers and
acquisitions are scanty (and generally not available), we have patchy evidence from popular press,
providing some insight into the state of a .airs in some countries. In principle, most countries in
opening up to privatization and market liberalization have endorsed mergers and acquisitions. In
practice, most applications still have to be cleared by the competition commission in various
countries, and approved by the securities commission. Generally, from reading the press, approvals
have been forthcoming.
In late October 2000, African Lakes Plc announced its acquisition bid for TelCorp Limited.
If approved by the Kenya Monopolies Commission, it will represent the biggest technology takeover
in Kenya’s corporate history. The takeover is said to come at a time when both parent groups had
just launched rival business-to-business e-commerce exchanges. TelCorps owns Electrade which
is a $7m joint venture with General Electric. Africa Lakes Plc owns Africa Online, a leading
internet access provider in Kenya. Another subsidiary of Africa Lakes is Altech with regional
operations in Kenya, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. In Nigeria, mergers and acquisitions are
commonplace. Similarly, in Zimbabwe where there has actually been a spurry of mergers and
acquisitions in the late 90s particularly in the financial services sector. South Africa has a
demonstrated record of acquisitions and merger activities. The number of deals in 1998 were
605, and in 1999 were 914. However, outright hostile takeover attempts have been few. So far,
none has been successful.
Goldstein (2000) describes the most recent and the first large-scale hostile takeover bid in
the history of market for corporate control in South Africa. It involved an attempt in November
1999 by NEDCOR banking group to ac-quire at least 50.1 percent of STANBIC. The merger
would have placed the new group in the global 150 banks. The target company resisted and
every-body got pulled into the fight–the Central Bank, the Competition Board, the court, and
politics. STANBIC antitakeover defenses included appointing to its board, the immediately past
Reserve Bank Governor, and Transnet Managing Director, who is a senior party member of the
ruling party, the African National Congress. To appreciate the significance of this move, consider
that Transnet is South Africa’s largest state-owned enterprise [SOE], measured in terms of turnover,
and second in terms of total assets. Also, it is the largest employer of labor among the SOEs,
accounting for 100,592 employees. The distant second is Telkom, the national telephone network
carrier, with 57, 496 employees and third ranked in total assets and turnover.
The last issue we visit is the structure of ownership and ownership concentration. It appears
that in the few cases in which data is available, many of the listed firms belong to both local and
multinational investors, the ultimate owners of which are unreported. It is certainly possible that in
many of the countries, politicians have used nominee companies to stake their interests in
corporations. Hence, the widespread incidence of “crony capitalism” and lackluster enforcement
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La Porta et al. (1998) construct an ownership concentration measure in which they cumulate
the ownership stake of the three largest shareholders among the top ten publicly traded firms
worldwide. They find the mean concentration ratio to be 46 percent, leading them to conclude
that, “Dispersed ownership in large public companies is simply a myth” (p. 1146). They find that
even in the USA, the average for the 10 “most valuable” companies is 20 percent. In their global
sample, Nigeria, South Africa, and Zimbabwe score 0.40 (0.45), 0.52(0.52), 0.55(0.51)
respectively. Respectively, the numbers in the parenthesis are the median value for the countries.
In South Africa, where wealth is most concentrated, Anglo alone controlled 60.1 percent of the
listed firms on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange in 1987. In 1991, the top five shareholders
controlled 84.9 percent, and in 1997, approximately 66.4 percent (Goldstein, 2000, Table 2).
Despite the existence of concentrated ownership either in personal or institutional format, the
problem of corporate governance has largely persisted. As a matter of fact, it can be argued that
there is a moral hazard aspect to concentrated holding: Large blockholders monitoring a firm may
use their private information to extract rents from the firm, the extent of which depends on the
labyrinth of crony capitalism in the system or the quality of Rule of Law (understand: protection of
minority rights). On the other hand, the events unfolding during the hostile bid by NEDCOR for
STANBIC revealed investor activism at work even if in this case the intervention of a very large
investor proved insufficient to close the deal. Old Mutual, the second largest institutional investor
in South Africa in 1997, controls NEDCOR, is the single largest STANBIC investor, and supported
the merger. It threatened to off load STANBIC shares if the merger stalled. Yet, the management
fought undeterred. Going beyond a mere metaphor, this event may have taken the term, management
entrenchment, to a new height.
10. Policies for improving governance
The quality of corporate governance may not be independent of the quality of state governance.
The quality of the state provides the backbone (the “soft-core” infrastructure) upon which board
of directors can govern, and upon which the shareholders can “redirect” the directors or monitor
the Monitor. Based on the ideas and lessons presented in this paper, it is clear that the idea
embodied in the concept of corporate governance is applicable to a wider class of problems,
including relationships where no formal delegation is explicitly involved.
As the boundaries of the firm become more blurred, placing firms at the center of a network
of relationships rather than traditionally as owners of a clearly defined set of capital assets, so has
governance become more subtle and sophisticated, more of art than science. If therefore, a firm is
a nexus of contracts, it is easy to understand how securities are not simply claims on cash flow, but
rights of decision making and control (i.e., they define alternative governance modes). Obviously,
the rights attached to financial securities become critical when managers of companies act in self-
interest. Rights which are in turn predicated on the legal environment in which the securities are
operative. And since procedure is of essence, as is usually the case under systems that rely on
institutions, therefore, policies which promote equal protection and opportunity under the law are
absolutely essential to achieving good governance. Pushing outcomes towards equal protection
includes reducing the cost of seeking redress so that de jure protection approximates de facto
protection. When the exercise of rights is prohibitively expensive, such rights are effectively denied.
Making boards effective requires policies that impact on both “the carrot and the stick.” The
carrot concerns the fact that directors in Africa and elsewhere for that matter, earn fees. Stock
related compensation would work better as it aligns their interests with that of the long-term18 Melvin D. Ayogu
growth of the companies. Although derivatives are not traded in Africa, private contracts can be
crafted that mimics cal l options on the stock of the companies.7 A stable policy environment will
ultimately give rise to the development of these features of the capital market. Markets will evolve
to serve the needs of the participants but such evolution often risk derailment in bad (understand:
unstable) policy environments.
To complement the fresh carrot, there has to be an effective stick. You can’t “stick” effectively
unless the state provides the enabling environment in the nature of Rule of Law. Threats to punish
will lack the bite when there are no credible enforcement mechanisms. So, failures of government
invariably affect the quality of corporate governance.
To conclude the discussion on the effectiveness of boards, we visit the core issue of board
room dynamics. The boards of directors are known to work through committees [see Table 1].
Working through committees raises the issue of “board room culture” which in turn brings into the
analysis, the role of tradition, expectations, perceptions and morality. So, if directors who do not
follow the wishes of stockholders are removed, what then are the wishes of the stockholders?
Discerning the desires of stakeholders are of importance particularly since the concept of corporate
governance has become encompassing, moving beyond stockholders and creditors to embrace a
more diverse constituency, with heterogenous and changing preferences. The appropriate choices
to be made on behalf of stakeholders are not self-evident, even granting that the interest of the
stockholders should be paramount (or should it?) And even when the desired behavior maybe
clear, there are issues about whether it will be pursued. How would the retrenchment or dismissal
of employees be conditioned when there are strong interdependencies in the nature of the “extended
family system” that can turn one dismissal into the bankruptcy of an entire clan or village? Such
concern often leads to politicization of an ostensibly business decision as was the case in NEDCOR
vs. STANBIC told above (but for a different reason). Nonetheless, NED-COR/ STANBIC
illustrates that business can get politicized. The higher the stakes, the greater the likelihood.
Without doubt, the nature of representations that stakeholders can expect from boards of
corporations, depends on the social background of representatives, as well as on their consciousness
or substantive orientations. In particular, a dimension of representation called “consciousness” is
concerned with how representatives see the interests they represent and how they act on behalf of
those interests. How they serve those interests is shaped by opportunities to influence events.
These opportunities may in turn be shaped by the social, cultural and political settings of that
economy. We believe that social orientations matter because culture–defined as a shared set of
values, way of thinking, and beliefs about how things should be done–can be a powerful force.
Cognitive psychologists find that preferences are not fixed but variable. In particular, that “preferences
depend on the framing of choices, the context in which choices are made, and the method by
which choices are elicited” (Kuran, 1998, p. 232). “The method by which choices are elicited”
clearly relates to our discussion of board room dynamics. According to Kuran (1998), when
constraints that regulated our actual choice do not restrain our values, we are left in a situation
where our values require of us an impossible set of behavior. This is typical of what happens in
some ethnically divided African countries with fiscal federalism. The pressure to “bring the bacon
home” to constituencies often generate corrupt practices in otherwise morally upright representatives.
“The state of having values that cannot be satisfied within the prevailing physical and financial
constraints may be called moral overload. This condition inevitably generates moral dissonance,
psychological discomfort stemming from the feeling that one’s personal values remain unfulfilled”
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It is fairly straightforward and comforting to prescribe that countries should enact corporate
laws designed to reduce the threshold for Extraordinary General meetings, make proxy fights
more likely, promote a vibrant market for corporate control, and eschew crony capitalism. In
short, deal with all the issues listed in Table 1. And in addition, get rid of corruption since corruption
is closely linked to corporate governance. A corrupt system influences corporate governance
through its impact on the calculus of crime and punishment, as well as on the credibility of the
apparatus for enforcing corporate rules, procedures and regulations. What is not so straightforward,
and certainly not comforting is to note that the necessary laws already exist in books of most of the
African countries. And that these laws are encumbered by crony capitalism and moral overload.
Privatization, clearly defined property rights, and progress with the rule of law ultimately will
resolve crony capitalism. Unfortunately, we do not have answers on how to engineer a repair of
moral overload.
Now, allow us to tell you a story. Hollywood makes two kinds of evil. They remind us of the
problem of governance, but we will let you judge for yourself. The evil inside and the evil outside.
The evil outside lurks in the corner making all kinds of menace. Our hero and heroine decide to
put an end to that, and we are happy to watch Superman and Wonderwoman do their thing. And
the neighborhood sleeps well henceforth. On the other hand, we watch the “exorcist” and are
horrified and frustrated as the evil inside destroys both the hero (the exorcist) and the heroine (the
little girl’s loving mother). In this alternative Hollywood incarnation, the “dark side” wins by
masterfully exploiting the struggle by these two mortals, to sort the shifting perception of good and
evil (the schizophrenia) in the adorable little Megan.20 Melvin D. Ayogu
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